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I. INTRODUCTION
Fault trees are used in many fields of application to
aid in assessing the probability of failure of a complex
binary system as a result of sub-system or component failures.
An algorithm is presented here for computing the exact failure
probability for binary systems represented as fault trees.
Due to the improved efficiency of this algorithm over those
currently in use, reliability engineers and other users will
find it useful for conducting fault tree analyses in which
multiple computations of failure probabilities are needed.
Fault trees are commonly used models to represent failures
in complex electrical, mechanical, and other systems. Their
use- originated in 1961 at Bell Telephone Laboratories in the
safety assessment of the Minuteman Launch-Control System
[Ref. 1] . Since then many other applications for fault trees
have been found. Arnborg [Ref. 2] refers to their use in
weapons effectiveness models, and Atkinson [Ref. 3] uses a
fault tree model to analyze a naval weapons system. Ball
[Ref. 4] uses fault trees to identify critical zones and
components of aircraft subjected to anti-aircraft fire. Other
areas in which fault tree models have been applied include
nuclear power plant safety [Refs. 5,6,7,8], electrical sys-
tems [Ref. 9], computer hardware design [Ref. 10], and chemical
processing [Ref. 11].
Efficient methods for computing the probability of system
failure or, equivalently , system reliability are needed for
users with large fault trees to analyze. One use for such
computations is in obtaining importance measures for basic
events or component failures. Importance measures are methods
of assigning numerical values to basic events which in some
way gauge how critical a component is to system reliability.
These values are useful for sensitivity analysis. For example
in an electrical circuit the failure of a component linked in
series will be more critical to system reliability than will
the same component linked in parallel. In a complex system
such structural characteristics may not be so obvious. Impor-
tance measures will reflect the relative importance to the
system resulting from system structure and component charac-
teristics for each component. Lambert [Ref. 12] discusses
four measures of event importance which can be computed
exactly or approximately given a method for computing system
reliability.
Needs exist for efficient system reliability computations
for other uses. Mizukami [Ref. 13] and Derman, et al. [Ref.
14], discuss constrained problems of resource allocation with
the objective of maximizing system reliability such as
max h (p_(y_) )
s.t. Jy. < A
where y. is the amount of resource allocated to component i,
p_(y_) is an m-vector of failure probabilities of the components
given y_, an<3 h(p_(y_)) is the system reliability. Since h(p_(y_))
is nonlinear, this problem requires a solution using nonlinear
programming techniques [Ref. 15]. Most of these techniques
require computation of the objective function gradient at
each iteration. Each component i in the gradient evaluated
at y_ is given by
a
. 9h 3p. 3p.
W7 = Ij^W1 = I(h(E (Z)| Pj =D - h(p_(y) |p =0)) ^
Thus each gradient computation requires 2m computations of
h(p_(y_)) .
In some binary systems the failures of some of the basic
components are statistically dependent. In these cases,
computation of system failure probability requires numerical
integration. For instance, if components i, j, and k are
dependent while all other component failure probabilities are
independent, then system failure probability g (p) can be
found using
111
9(P) = / / / 9<Rl (Pi =xi'Pj =x j 'Pfc =xk ))f (x i' x j .xk )dx idx j dxk
where g(p|(p. =x. ,p. =x.,p, = x, )) is the system failure
probability with the probabilities of components i, j, and k
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fixed, and f(x.,x.,x,) the joint probability density function
1 j k
of components i, j , and k. Numerical integration of this
function requires many computations of system failure proba-
bility. The more rapidly that g (pj (p. =x.,p. = x . ,p, = xv ) )
can be computed, the smaller the increments of numerical
integration can be, and the more accurate g(p_) will be.
Many fault trees used in applications are quite large.
Arnborg [Ref. 2] states that some of the military models used
in practice require as many as 100,000 evaluations of fault
trees containing as many as 1000 basic components to evaluate
performance over different tactical situations. Reliability
optimization, numerical integration, and importance determina-
tion cannot be performed on some of these larger fault trees
given current methods. It is obvious that a need exists for
more efficient methods to compute system failure probability
for binary systems.
A. DEFINITIONS AND NOTATION
A fault tree is used to represent a binary system. A
binary system is a system in which all components and the
entire system are assumed to be either completely operational
or completely failed. A binary system is denoted (C,$) where
C is the set of components and $ is a binary function of the
component states. Let x. e {0,1} represent the state of the
ith component of a binary system with m components. The system
state is given by $ (x) e {0,1}, where x = (x, ,x~,...,x ) is




,x) where x. is arbitrary for j f i. Setting
x. = 1 yields a state vector of (l.,x). Likewise if every
basic component i is assigned a probability p., then
P = (P-i /Pp / • • • / P ) is a vector of given probabilities. The
probability of a system failure is given by g(p_), and system
reliability is given by h(p) = 1 - g(p_) . If p. = 0, then the
vector p is denoted (0.,p_) where p. maintains its original




A binary system can be coherent or noncoherent. A system
is coherent if $ is monotonically increasing, and all components
are relevant. Component i is relevant if $(l.,x) ^ <f>(0.,x) for
some value of the state vector x. If the system state is
constant in x. for all values of x, then component i is
irrelevant [Ref. 16: p. 6].
Fault trees are the most commonly used models of binary
systems. A fault tree is denoted F = (E,L) where E is the set
->
of events, and L is the set of links. An event e. e E is a
l
pair e. = (v.,t.) where v. e V is the event vertex and t. e Tc l l l l l





= (v.,v.) e L where the ordered pair (v., v.) denotes a
directed link from e. to e . . Link I . . transmits the output
from event e. to the input of event e.. The out-degree of
->
e. is the number of j such that (v., v.) e L. The in-deqreei J i j v
of e. is the number of i such that (v., v.) e L.
D i :
Three graphs- derived from F will be useful. H = (V,L)
is a directed graph with links directed "upward" as in F;
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H = (V,L) is similar to H but with its links directed in the
opposite, i.e., "downward", direction; and H = (V,L) is an
undirected graph where L is L taken as an unordered set.
A further requirement for F to be a fault tree is that H
be acyclic and possess a unique vertex v. > v. for all
v. ?* v. in any acyclic ordering of V. In the graph H, v.
corresponds to the top event e. of F. The state of the top
event is the system state $(x) . The top event is dependent
on intermediate and basic events and has out-degree zero.
Intermediate events (or logic events) are any events with out-
degrees and in-degrees both greater than zero. A basic event
represents a system component, and has in-degree zero. The
number of basic events is m. For now, it is assumed that all
basic events are statistically independent, randomly occurring
events
.
For examples of fault tree event types consider a model
of a complex tactical aircraft. This aircraft is composed
of many basic components such as electrical generators,
hydraulic pumps, flight control cables, and others for which
failures can be assumed to be statistically independent. (For
this aircraft assume that these components are independently
powered.) The failures of these basic components are repre-
sented in a fault tree by basic events. Each of these com-
ponents is a part of a greater system, i.e., electrical,
hydraulic, and flight controls, respectively. Failures of
these sub-systems become the intermediate events of the fault
13
tree. Failures in basic components cause failures in inter-
mediate components which may ultimately lead to occurrence
of the top event, aircraft failure.
In the fault tree each event has a type, t. e T. For the
top and intermediate events, t. denotes a logic type, e.g.,
AND, OR, while for basic events, t. is type BASIC. Any event
with an out-degree greater than one represents a ve-plicated
event. The number of replicated events in the fault tree is
denoted by r.
Table 1-1 shows the logical operations performed at e
.
on the events e. linked into e. by the links I. ..
1 j * ij
TABLE 1-1
Logical Operations
Logic Event Input Output
->-
AND x. for all i s.t. (v.,v.) e L n x.
l in .1J l
OR x. for all i s.t. (v.,v.) e L 1 - n(l -x.)
l l' j i
l




K-out-of-N x. for all i s.t. (v., v.) e L
1 X J
I v
\ for > x. <k
h l
l
NOT x. 1 - x.
l l
Logic types included in T are AND, OR, NOT, and (at least)
K-out-of-N. Other logic types are possible, but these are
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the most commonly encountered in fault tree models. In fact,
all structure functions can be represented using only logic
types AND, OR, and NOT. NOT events will always have an out-
degree and in-degree of one, and their presence implies a
noncoherent system. Figure 1-1 displays the symbols for
events to be discussed in this thesis. This thesis will only
consider these event types since they are the most common,
and the algorithm developed using these event types can be
easily extended to other types.
An event tree is a generalization of a fault tree in which
system operation or failure can be represented. Event trees
representing failures are usually referred to as fault trees.
There are no structural or computational differences between
fault trees and event trees, and the term "fault tree" is
used throughout this thesis. Another representation of a
binary system which is used is the reliability network . This
representation is not considered here since it does not lend
itself to modeling general binary systems [Ref. 17].
A module is a set of basic events which behave as one
event. Consider a binary system (C,$) with A <=_ C, and let
x = (xA /X— ) . If $(x) = $' ($" (x. )xr-) , for structure functions
$' and $", then (A,<f>") is a module [Ref. 16: p. 16].
A module in a binary system can often be directly recog-
nized in a fault tree. Consider the graph H derived from F
and a specified vertex v.. If H is connected, and H-v . is
: :
disconnected, then v. is a cut vertex, and e . is a out event.
15
+ WI@ o
AND OR 2-OUT-OF-3 NOT BASIC
Figure 1-1 Logic Events
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H -v. = {HQ ,H, ,H2 , . . . ,H. } , where each H. is connected for all
i, but there is no connection between H. and H. for i 4 i,
1 j ' J
and where H_ contains the vertex corresponding to the top
event of F. Let H. = (V^,L. ) , and E^^ = {e £ : e £ = (v £ ,t £ )
for all v
c
e V.}. Then, F. = (E. + e.,L. u {JL. eL: v, eV.})
is an F-module for i = l,2,...,k with cut event e.. The
non-null union of any combination of these F. is also an




Consider the F-module F' = (E',L') in F. Let e. e E
be any event connected into the cut event e . by links
->
I . . e L. If e. e E 1 for all i, then e. is an F-module top,
and F' is a simple F-module . If separated from F, a simple
F-module with an F-module top has the same properties as a
fault tree. The cut event of a general F-module may have other
e. connected into it where e. / E'. and therefore does not
l l '
necessarily possess all the fault tree properties. F is
always an F-module of F. Any other F-module in F is a proper
F-module . An F-module is trivial if it contains only one or
more unreplicated basic events plus the cut event. Any F,
whose only proper F-modules are trivial, is a prime F-module
.
In a graph H, if a maximal set of vertices V"
n £ V exists
such that for every distinct subset of three vertices
(v.,v.,v, } c \/ there exists a path between v. and v. not
l j k — r i j
containing v, , then v n is a biconneoted oomponent [Ref. 18:K (J
p. 179] . If all paths from any v. e V- to any v, / V
n
must
pass through the same vertex v . e V„ for i ^ j, then v. is




Computation of any problem on a digital computer requires
time and storage. Let f be some function of the size of the
fault tree such as f(|E|) or f ( | L | ) . Then let 0(f) be a
known linear function of f which provides an upper bound on
some requirement for the problem. 0(f) is the algorithmic
complexity of the problem for the specific requirement. If
the requirement is space, then 0(f) denotes the storage
requirement in terms of the problem size, while if the require-
ment is time, it denotes the CPU time required in the same
terms
.
Although not utilized in this study, later reference will
be made to other fault tree algorithms which utilize cut
sets and path sets. A cut set is a set of basic events whose
occurrence ensures occurrence of the top event. A cut set
is minimal if no event can be removed while still ensuring
occurrence of the top event. A path set is a set of basic
events whose nonoccurrence ensures nonoccurrence of the top
event. [Ref. 16: p. 9] (This terminology originates from
network reliability.)
B. PROBLEM DEFINITION AND COMPLEXITY
The objective of this thesis is to develop an efficient
algorithm to compute g(p), the probability of the top event
of a fault tree. It is assumed that a probability p. for
each basic event in F is known. However, assignment of a
probability p . to a basic event is only correct when certain
assumptions about the modeled system can be made. These
18
assumptions are valid for the three categories of systems
described below.
The first category is the set of non-repairable systems.
In this case p. = F. (t) is the probability that component i
has failed by time t [Ref . 19] . System failure by time t
then is g(F(i)) . A tactical aircraft on a mission is an
example of a non-repairable system where the interval (0,t)
represents the time span from takeoff to landing.
The second category is the set of systems for which com-
ponent "up" and "down" times form independent renewal processes
[Ref. 19]. Here, D. is the component "down" time, and U.
is the component "up" time. The probability that component i
is "down" or in a failed state at a given instant of time and
the proportion of time that i will spend in a "down" state









An example of this type of system is an electrical power
generating station which runs continuously.
The final category of failures is point failures.
failures are realized if a system fails to activate when its
"on" switch is engaged. In this case p. and g(p) are simply
the probabilities that component i and the system, respectively,
fail to activate. Point failure is a fair assumption for
modeling the probability that an aircraft to be flown on a
19
mission fails to pass the pre-flight safety checks and conse-
quently cannot begin the mission.
Let g(p) denote the probability of the top event in a
fault tree, and let g.(p) denote the probability of occurrence
of an intermediate event i. In a fault tree without repli-
cated events, computation of g(p_) is easy. Since the top
and intermediate events are represented by logic events, e.,
their probability can be computed directly if the events, e.,
for all i s.t. (v., v.) e L are all mutually independent and
have known probabilities. The equations used to compute these




AND g- (p) = n p.
-1 i
1
OR g. (p) = 1 - 11(1 -p. )
J " i
X
2-out-of-3 g. (p_) = P XP 2P 3 + (l-p 1 )p 2 P 3 +p ± (l-p 2 )p 3
+ P1P 2 (1 -P 3 )
NOT g (p) = 1 - Pi
Hwang [Ref. 20] and Shanthikumar [Ref. 21] provide recursive
algorithms for general K-out-of-N systems which operate in
polynomial time. Using these equations g(p) can be found by
20
computing g. (p) at each logic event from the bottom of the
fault tree to the top event. This procedure can be used in
any fault tree without replicated events. Computation of
top event probability for a fault tree in this case can be





_> |e| - 1, and 0(|E| + |l|) is effec-
tively ( | L | ) . ) Referring to Figure l-2a, F is searched from
the top event downward, i.e., following H. When an intermedi-
ate event which has only basic input events is found, the
probability of the intermediate event is computed, and it
becomes a basic event. The search continues, gradually
reducing all intermediate events to basic events in a back-
tracking procedure until the top event probability is computed
These reductions are simple reductions , and a formal algorithm
to perform them is given in Chapter II.
The assumption of independence among input events which
allows simple reductions cannot be made throughout a fault
tree containing replicated events. Any two events e. and e.
which are on separate directed paths from the same replicated
event e, cannot be assumed to be independent since the states
of e. and e. both depend on e, . Replicated events complicate
the computation of top event probability. In fact, Rosenthal
showed the problem of computing g(p) for a fault tree F
containing replicated events to be a member of the class of
nondeterministic polynomial hard (NP hard) problems [Ref. 22].
Consequently, no algorithm exists or is likely to be developed
21
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a. Without Replicated Events
AV^
o o
b. With Replicated Events
Figure 1-2 Fault Trees
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to compute g(p_) in time bounded by a polynomial function of
the number of events [Ref. 23: p. 113]. The best known upper
bound on time for any algorithm to solve g (p_) is an exponen-
tial function of the problem size. The best known bound on
space, however, is polynomial.
Despite the inherent exponential complexity of the prob-
lem, it is still possible to exactly compute g(p) for many
moderate sized fault trees. It is the purpose of this study
to take advantage of structural properties of fault trees
to extend the range of problems for which exact probabilities
can be computed. The method described for use in a fault
tree with no replicated events will be useful as a subroutine
in a more general algorithm.
C. COMPUTATIONAL METHODS
Several different exact and approximate methods for
probabilistic analysis of fault trees have been developed
for fault trees with replicated events. Most of these methods
ignore the topological structure of the fault tree while rely-
ing on cut set enumeration to compute g(p) . Because of the
inefficiency of these methods, exact values of g(p) are not
computable for large systems and must be approximated by use
of upper and lower bounds or Monte Carlo simulation.
1. Existing Methods
Current methods for computing g (p_) for binary systems
represented as fault trees can be placed into two categories
,
those using cut sets and those not using cut sets. Methods
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which use cut sets include "inclusion-exclusion" [Ref. 24:
p. 98-101], "sum of disjoint products" [Refs. 25,26J, and
" Z II " [Ref. 27] . A common requirement of these methods is the
enumeration and storage of all cut sets. The number of cut
sets in a binary system can be exponential in the size of
the system. Therefore, for a large system these methods may
be limited to approximations for g(p). Using the inclusion-
exclusion and sum of disjoint products methods the generation
of all terms needed for computation of g(p) is exponential
in the number of cut sets. Consequently, for both of these
methods the complexity is exponential on an exponential
function of the problem size. Most methods which depend on
cut sets never take advantage of the structure of the systems
they model, such as the presence of modules or other simpli-
fying properties, and, consequently, are guaranteed to always
require large amounts of time and space to compute g(p)
.
ZII, which locates independent blocks of cut sets and evalu-
ates them separately, can achieve exponentially better effi-
ciency than the sum of disjoint products methods.
Two methods which do not use cut sets are "PAFT F77"
[Ref. 28] and "reduced state enumeration" [Ref. 2] . These
methods are based on the fault tree model of a binary system.
PAFT F77 removes all replicated basic events by conditioning
and then uses simple reductions to compute g(p). This method
does not allow replicated intermediate events, and is
guaranteed an actual complexity factor which is exponential
24
in the number of replicated basic events. Reduced state
enumeration enumerates the states of each replicated event
e. over any cut event e.. Reduction is achieved since the1 D
states of all e. below e. can be replaced by the states of
e. in an expression for the states of some e, above e..
3 k j
This method is only useful, however, when no prime F-modules
of the fault tree contain a large number of replicated events.
Of the methods discussed above only PAFT F77 takes
advantage of topological reductions and then only in a crude
manner. This thesis applies probabilistic structural reduc-
tions to fault trees. Although theoretical complexity remains
exponential in the number of replicated events, actual com-
plexity will be reduced by these reductions.
2 . Recursive Pivotal Decomposition
Let g(F) denote the system failure probability for
a particular fault tree F. If F has no replicated events,
g(F) may be computed by repeated application of simple reduc-
tions. When F is reduced to a single basic event e.,
g(F) = p-. If, after all simple reductions have been made,
F is not reduced to a single event, some replicated basic
event e. must remain. From the theorem of total probability,
for any remaining basic event e.
g(p) = p ig(l i ,p) + (1 -p i )g(O i ,£)
for a binary system. This is the equation for pivotal
decomposition . For a fault tree the equation becomes
25
whe






re F, is a fault tree derived from F given that e. has
occurred, and F
n
is a fault tree derived from F given that
e. has not occurred. If simple reductions completely reduce
F-, and F
n
, then g(F, ) and g(F~) are computed, and g(F) can
then be computed. If not, events in F, and/or F
n
are selected
for conditioning, and the procedure is repeated recursively
until all failure probabilities can be computed through simple
reductions or until conditioning implies g(F,|x.) = or 1
.
Figure 1-3 shows a recursive decomposition of a fault tree F.
Recursive pivotal decomposition is further enhanced
by identification of proper F-modules. If simple reductions
fail to reduce F to a basic event e., then F may contain a
J
non-trivial F-module F'. If F' is a simple, proper F-module
with module top e., then pivotal decomposition may be applied
to compute g(F l ) . F can then be replaced by F -F' +e. where
t. = BASIC, and p. = g(F'). Using this modularization an
exponential reduction in computation can be achieved, especially
when repeated on recursively produced fault trees.
For small fault trees pivotal decomposition may be
repeated quickly to compute g(F) for different values of p
when necessary as in the constrained reliability maximization
problem. For moderate to large-sized fault trees it may be
26
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Figure 1-3 Pivotal Decomposition
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possible to use pivotal decomposition to compute g(F) once
in a reasonable amount of time but not multiple times. In
this case it is possible to perform the simple reductions and
pivotal decomposition on F without actually computing the
probabilities in the process but, instead, saving each equa-
tion which would have been used to compute probabilities.
When F has been completely reduced, the saved equations form
an expression for g(p_) . This expression may now be used for
rapid recomputations of g(p) without much of the work asso-
ciated with the original fault tree algorithm.
Assuming that only replicated events are conditioned,
time complexity for pivotal decomposition combined with
simple reductions is 0(2 | L | ) for g(F) . This is true since
r is the greatest recursion level ever required to condition
r replicated events. The time complexity of the expression
g(p) will be identical to that of g(F) since g(p) will
merely execute the computations produced in equational form
by g(F). Actual time savings will, however, be realized by
execution of the expression g(p) since building, storing,
and reducing the structure of F is unnecessary. The space
complexity of storing one fault tree is ( | L | ) . For each
step of conditioning, two different reductions must be per-
formed on the same fault tree. To do this a copy of the cur-
rent fault tree must be created and stored until it has been
completely reduced. At the rth level of recursion, r copies
of the fault tree are being stored. Consequently, the space
28
complexity for g(F) is 0(r|L|) . Space complexity for
storage of the expression g(p_) is proportional to the
time complexity of g(F).
Improvement of the actual time required to compute
probabilities over existing methods will be attempted by
taking advantage of fault tree structure, modularizing when




The main algorithm performs recursive pivotal decomposi-
tion combined with simple reductions on a fault tree. The
main features of this algorithm and its supporting elements
are presented in this chapter. F will be used to denote a
fault tree with a probability assigned to each basic event.
For notational simplicity let |f| denote |e| for F = (E,L).
A. FAULTTREE
Faulttree is the primary algorithm used in this thesis.
(See Figure 2-1.) The argument F is a simple F-module. In
the first call to Faulttree, F is the original fault tree,
but in all subsequent calls it is an F-module. (It will not
necessarily be a proper F-module.) Faulttree receives F as
an argument and returns the F-module top and its probability.
Sreduce performs all possible simple reductions on F,
and if it reduces F to a basic event, Faulttree is finished.
Otherwise, Faulttree will carry out further reductions using
recursive pivotal decomposition. Findmodule searches for and
returns a simple F-module F n in F. Also returned is e . , ther
• j
F-module top. If no proper, simple F-modules exist, F« = F.
F,, a copy of F
n
, is produced so that two fault trees can be
conditioned. At the end of the "if" block F
n
remains in F
but as a basic event with probability given by the pivotal




input: A fault tree or simple F-module F with associated
basic event probabilities
output: The top event of F-module top e . of F and its
probability -1
begin
While ( |F| > 1) do
begin
(F,p) «- Sreduce (F) ;
if i|f| =1) then Return (F,p)
else
begin
(F ,ej) «- Findmodule (F) ;
e
i
*• Select (F ) s.t. t. = BASIC;
fJ «- Copy (F Q ) ;
(FifPi) * Condition (F^e-,1);
if ( | Fi | >1) then (e.^f «- Faulttree (F,);
{ dummy 1 } ; -1
(F ,p ) « Condition (F ,e if 0) ;
if (|F
| >D then (ej,p ) « Faulttree (F Q ) ;
?j * Pi?; + (1 -Pi } Po ;
{ dummy 2 }
;
tj f- BASIC;






"{dummy 2}" mark the spots where equation print statements
can be inserted. This cycle of Sreduce, Findmodule, and
pivotal decomposition on an F-module is continued until all
F-modules are completely reduced.
Significant reductions in actual run times should be
realized through the use of modularization. If a simple F-
module can be located with s replicated events in a fault
tree with r replicated events, then reduction methods
can be applied to the F-module alone. After reducing
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the F-module to a basic event, reductions continue on the
remainder of the fault tree. Using these methods the original
r s r— s
complexity factor of 2 reduces to 2 + 2 „ By searching
for F-modules and independently reducing each one, much time
is saved.
Actual storage requirements can be expected to be well
below the upper bound of 0(r|L|). Actual storage could only
be this large if at each level of recursion during pivotal
decomposition a copy of the original fault tree must be made.
This cannot happen since at least one and frequently many
events are removed at each conditioning step, thus gradually
reducing the size of the fault tree as the level of recursion
increases. Additionally, these operations are being performed
on F-modules. Whenever a proper F-module is found, the size
of the copy to be produced and stored is reduced.
1 . Sreduce
This algorithm is sufficient for completely reducing
F if it contains no replicated events. Sreduce is shown in
Figure 2-2. Sreduce does a depth first search in H to find
any event e. with only unreplicated, basic events directly
below. When such an e . is found it is reduced to a basic
D
event, g
. (p) is computed, and all of the unreplicated, basic
events can be disposed. As the algorithm backtracks to the
top event, each F-module which has no replicated events is
reduced to a single basic event. Upon leaving Sreduce, the




input: A simple F-module F with associated basic event
probabilities
output: If fully reduced, the F-module top with its proba-
bility. Else, a partially reduced F
begin
for all ej_ e E mark e^ "reducible";
put module top of F on stack;
while stack not empty do
begin
let e.; be the top element of the stack;
For each untraversed £-h a £ do
begin
traverse £.jj_;
if e^ replicated then mark ej "irreducible";
if e-j_ "reducible" and not BASIC then put e.
on stack and let e. «- e . ;
end; : 1
remove e.; from stack;
if e-; "reducible" then
begin
Pj "*" 9J (p) an<^ mark ej BASIC;{dummy 3j;
end;
else mark top element of stack "irreducible";
end;
if (|f| = 1) then Return ( {e . ,<J>} ,p . )
else Return (F,undef ined) ^ ^
end.
Figure 2-2 Sreduce
events. "{dummy 3}" is a marker for inserting the print
statements for g. (p) . The time complexity of a call to
Sreduce is ( | L | )
.
2 . Findmodule
This algorithm is a modification of Hopcroft's [Ref.
18 :p. 185] depth first search for biconnected components.
The search for biconnected components is effectively carried
out in H -V where H is derived from F, after performing all
possible simple reductions, and V is the set of unreplicated
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basic event vertices. As a result only F-modules containing
at least one replicated event are found. Although Findmodule
locates any such F-module, it returns only simple F-modules
to Faulttree. If a located F-module is not simple, Findmodule
will restructure it into a simple F-module with an F-module
top or perform some other type of restructuring before return-
ing it to Faulttree. These special restructuring procedures
are described in Section C of this chapter. The time complex-
ity of this routine is ( | L | ) . Findmodule terminates as
soon as an F-module is located.
3. Conditioning
Great reductions in computation can be obtained by
selective conditioning in Faulttree. After locating an
F-module F, a replicated basic event e. is selected for
conditioning. "Condition" is a procedure for making the
associated reductions in F and is shown in Figure 2-3.
Condition also uses a depth first search, but from
the replicated event outward, transmitting the effect of
conditioning on the replicated event to other events in F.
The search is conducted in (E,L u L) since other events both
above and below an event to be removed may also be determined
to be removable. Condition is configured for AND, OR, NOT,
and 2-out-of-3 gates. However, addition of other types is
easy. Any event to be removed from F is placed into the
stack. When event e. is removed from the stack, an outward
l
search is conducted to find any other events to remove from
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procedure condition (F,e^,x);
input: A simple F-module F, a basic event e. to condition, the
state of the condition x 1
output: If fully reduced, the F-module top and the state of
the top event. Else, a partially reduced F
begin
put e^ on stack
;
while stack not empty do
begin
remove e^ from stack;
_^
for all ej s.t. i^- e L do
begin
if ((in-degree (ej) =1) or ((t. =0R)
and (x=lj) or ( (t . = A$D) and
(x =0) ) ) then 3
begin
if (e^ = module top of F) then
Return ( { ej
,<f> } ,x) ;
put e . on stack
;






if (tj = 2-out-of-3) then
if (x = 1) then tj = OR
else t . = AND;
end
end
for all e.: s.t. I. e L do
begin J
if ej unreplicated than put e. on sti








Return (F , undefined)
Figure 2-3 Condition
F. If events are not to be removed, their links to e. are
l
disposed. An event which is unreplicated and connected into
e . from below will be placed into the stack for removal from
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F. The search looks upward from e. to events e. for all
I . . e L and performs logic checks. For example, if the
state variable x = 1, and t. = OR, then e. is placed into the
stack. NOT events change x to 1-x. 2-out-of-3 events are
transformed into AND or OR events depending on the current
value of x. If the search reaches the F-module top of F,
F is returned as a basic event with p = or 1 . If the F-
module top is not reached in the search, F is returned,
partially reduced from the form of the original argument.
The time complexity of this search is ( | L | )
.
4 . The Select Procedure
Printed equations can be used for multiple executions
of top event probability computations. In this case, condi-
tioning on basic events so as to minimize the number of
equations written will enhance efficiency even if the running
time of Faulttree is increased. One way to do this is to
develop a "good" procedure for selecting a replicated event
e. to condition. Various heuristics are possible such as
choosing the e. with greatest out-degree or the greatest or
least distance from the cut event. These qualities can be
determined with a routine in ( | L | ) time. A theoretically
stronger heuristic is
min (max | R .
|
)
e. £ ER j £ J
3
where E is the set of replicated basic events in F, J the
set of biconnected components remaining in the two fault trees
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after conditioning e., and R. the set of replicated events
in biconnected component j . A "select procedure" was imple-
mented to perform this. The procedure conditions on e.
using the algorithm Condition and creates the two fault trees
F~ . and F, .. Next, a depth first search is conducted in F n .Oi li c Oi
and F, ., counting the replicated events |R. | in each bicon-
nected component j. The biconnected components of H|x.
correspond to prime F-modules in f|x. and to components which
will become prime F-modules after recursively reducing current
F-modules. The maximum |R.| found in the two depth first
searches of F~ . and F n . is saved for each e. . These steps areOi li l r
repeated for all e. e E^, and that e. that minimizes |R.c l R l ' j '
is chosen for conditioning. This heuristic myopically mini-
mizes the upper bound factor max 2 J over all F-modules and
components which will become F-modules.
B. FAILURE PROBABILITY FUNCTION
A second version of Faulttree was modified to print a
set of equations which represent the failure probability
function g(p). All algorithms remain the same except that
probability computations are replaced with "print statements."
These statements are inserted in Faulttree and Sreduce in
the spots marked by "dummy" comments. Since numerical compu-
tations are correctly ordered, so must be the printing of
the equations. Faulttree must create an extra variable and
print an equation for storing the probability of the top
event for F, since its normal storage space will be overwritten
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by the probability of the top event for F . "Dummy 1" is
replaced by a statement to print the equation which stores
the conditional probability in this extra variable. The
pivotal decomposition equation is printed by a statement in
the line marked by "Dummy 2." Table 2 shows the statements




Dummy 1 XP [ j ] : =P [ j ] ;
Dummy 2 P [ j ] :=P [i] *XP [ j ] + ( 1 - P [ i ] ) *P [ j ] ;
In the table, j is the index of the F-module top while i is
the index of the event conditioned. In Sreduce "Dummy 3"
is replaced by a statement giving the equation for g . (p) .
In this case, the printed statement assigns a value to
"P[j]" by writing on the right hand side of the equation a
function of the basic, unreplicated events. The function to
be printed is dependent on t. and is taken from Table 1-2.
Although execution of g(p) is 0(2 |l|) just like the
computation of g(F), actual time should be much less. Storage
is also 0(2 |L|), an increase from the storage required for
direct computation of g(F). Storage of variables in g(p_) is
only 0(r+N) . Recall that r is the number of replicated
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events which also yields the maximum level of recursion, and
N is the total number of events in the fault tree. The r
term results from creating an extra variable at each level
of recursion to store conditional, top event probabilities.
The number of equations written is directly related to the
time complexity of computing g(F). The total storage require-
ments are therefore of the same order as the time complexity
of Faulttree, i.e., exponential. In practice, it is hoped
that the number of equations produced is small enough that
they can be evaluated efficiently.
C . ENHANCEMENTS
Proper application of Faulttree requires that F, whether
an F-module or a fault tree, possess the properties of a
fault tree. A general F-module does not necessarily meet
this requirement while a simple F-module always does. Two
enhancements to Findmodule, "event splitting" and "recon-
figuration," are methods of dealing with non-simple F-modules
Event splitting can be applied to an F-module with a cut
event of type AND or OR while reconfiguration is used for a
cut event of type 2-out-of-3. The last enhancement reduces
the number of equations produced by handling some simple
reductions implicitly.
1 . Event Splitting
When Findmodule locates a simple F-module F' with its
F-module top e,
, F' and e, are returned immediately to Fault-
tree. If F 1 is not simple, and t, = AND or OR, then event
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splitting may be applied. Since F' is not simple, e. { E'
must be linked into e, by £., £ L'. "Split" e, into two
events e, and e, such that t, = t, =t
i<-
/ ^ , k^ = ^'k
£.. eL'}, and {£., } = {£.,: £.-•£} + &, . . A simple
IK 1K« IX IK K-.K-
F-module F is formed by F = F 1 -e, +e, where e, is the\ K l k l
F-module top. Findmodule returns F to Faulttree. Event
splitting works since
x, n x. n • . . . . n x = x n (x, , , n x, i0 n , . . . , nx )1 2 ' n o k+1 k+ 2 n
for
x n = x, n x n ..... n x,12k
and since
x. u x~ u , . ••' UXn
= x u (xk+l uxk+2 " "'" uxn )
for
X- = X, U X„ U , . . . , U X,
Figure 2-4 shows the structural changes made to the fault
tree by event splitting.
2 . Reconfiguration
For a cut event e, of F-module F 1 with t, = 2-out-
of-3, three events e. are linked into the cut event e, of




Figure 2-4 Event Splitting
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basic events) with cut vertex v, . If F' is not simple, then
since v, e H ' exactly two of the e. e E', leaving one





let e. / E' be denoted e. . The possible states of the pair
1 1
3





and (0,1) are indistinguishable to e, . F' will be replaced
by e, and two basic events which will give an equivalent
representation of the probability information stored in F'.
To compute the needed probabilities a new top event e
.






removed, disconnecting F' -e, from F. Links I . and I . .







forming the new fault tree F. For e. e E let t. = AND and
: 3
call Faulttree to obtain
P(l,l) = (g (p) |t =AND)
Let t
.
= OR and call Faulttree to obtain
P((l,l) u (1,0) u (0,1)) = (g (p) |t. =OR)
e, is given a new event type which denotes a "reconfigured"
event with nonhomogeneous inputs. Two new basic events e„
and e are attached into e, by Z v ,^ v e L. p = P(l,l)
while p = P((1,0) u(0,l)) given by
*2
P((1,0) u(0,l)) = P((l,l) u (1,0) u (0,1)) - P ( 1 , 1
)
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Figure 2-5 exhibits the resulting structural modification
to the fault tree.
3. Replacement
Another enhancement made was a change to Sreduce.
Instead of computing g.(p) for a logic gate e. with only a
single basic event e. below, e. can simply be replaced by e
.
,
i.e., e. + e., p. «- p., and dispose e.. This is especially
helpful in forming the expression for g(p_) since one equation
is eliminated each time this replacement is made.
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ooooo 6h 1 t VO O O
rR denotes reconfigured event
Figure 2-5 Reconfiguration
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III. IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPUTATIONAL RESULTS
The computer codes for all programs are written in
Berkeley 3.0 Pascal to take advantage of the recursive feature
of this language. All tests on these programs were conducted
on a VAX 11/780 computer under the Berkeley 4.0 Unix operating
system. The main algorithm of the previous chapter was
transformed into the dual purpose program "Faulttree" which
can be used to directly compute g(F) or produce a subroutine
containing the equations for g(p_).
A. DATA STRUCTURES
The data structure used to represent the fault tree is
effectively (E,L u L) . That is, both upward and downward
pointing links are maintained out of each event. Some storage
could have been saved using only (E,L) and creating L when
needed, but this would have greatly increased the complexity
of the program. Maintaining both L and L allowed flexibility
for the various types of searches conducted in F during reduc-
tions and other operations. A depth first search using (V,L)
is performed in the simple reduction subroutine "Sreduce,"
a depth first search using (V,L u L) is performed in the
subroutine "Condition," and a depth first search using (V,L)
is performed in the subroutine "Findmodule" where (L i L)
is used to simulate L. The use of (V,L) was especially
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convenient in Condition. This allowed a depth first search
to remove events by starting at the basic event being con-
ditioned rather than beginning the search at the top event
which would require more time.
Because pivotal decomposition and other algorithms used
deal with dynamic fault trees by restructuring and making
reductions, the internal data structure for the computer
program should facilitate changes to F. This facilitation
was accomplished by the use of linked lists to represent
the events and links of F. Two features available in Pascal
which were useful for storing these linked lists are "records"
and "pointers." Two types of records were designated event
records and link records . A record allows the storage of
different data types within a single entity. Integers, reals,
arrays, and other types can be stored simultaneously in each
record. Two pointer types were designated event record
pointers and link record pointers .. The pointers were used
to connect events and links in the computer representation
of the fault tree, and were also used to move from one event
to another during searches through F.
Tables 3-1 and 3-2 list the information stored in event
and link records.
An event record is created for each e. in F . Each event
1
record has an up pointer and a down pointer . The up pointer
points to the first link of a set of links equal in number















pointer to link record








pointer to event record
pointer to link record
link by the variable next link. Every link in the data
structure points to an event record via the variable event
pointer . The event records pointed to represent the e.
which are linked from e. by {£..: I
.
. eL}. The down pointer
i ID ID
points to the first link of a set of links equal in number
to the in-degree of e.. These links are joined to one another
in the same way, and each points to an event record repre-
senting an e, which is linked into e. by \Z,-: £,. e Li
.
K 1 K 1 K
1





























Figure 3-1 Linking of Events
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Because of this data structure, it is easy to change the
fault tree during a search. Reductions can be made by delet-
ing a link and reconnecting the links on either end of it,
or by setting pointers to "nil." Event types or identifications
can be changed or newly computed basic event probabilities
stored. (Probabilities only need to be stored in event




Another feature of Pascal which was useful was its ability
to call procedures recursively. This capability was used
for pivotal decomposition so that recursive calls could be
made in the program Faulttree until F was reduced completely.
Although recursion could have been used in some subroutines,
it uses more time and storage [Ref. 29: p. 300] than non-
recursion and therefore was used only for pivotal decomposition.
In Pascal, records may be created and destroyed over the
course of a program so that storage is only used when needed.
This can be accomplished by use of the embedded functions
"new" and "dispose." Some conservation of storage must be
utilized in Faulttree when solving any large problems. Using
new when making a copy of F and dispose during the reductions
on F is one way to conserve storage. This way is time con-
suming, however, since invoking new, slows the program, and
extra searches which would otherwise be unnecessary are re-
quired to reach all events and links for disposals. To
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minimize storage and time concurrently, two arrays were
created at the beginning of the program, one to store event
records and the other to store link records. All records
needed for the entire program are created and placed into
these arrays. Records are re-used from these arrays by saving
the index of the last record currently in use. Whenever a
new record is needed it can be taken from the next point in
the array beyond the index. Prior to making a copy of F in
Faulttree, the current value of the index is saved in another
variable. This copy of F is then produced, increasing the
index value. The copy is passed as an argument to Faulttree.
Upon return from -Faulttree the copy is no longer needed, and
the index can be reset to its prior value. Meanwhile, as
reductions are made in Sreduce and Condition, the program
effectively "burns bridges" by setting pointers to nil where
events beyond these pointers are to be removed.
F-modules are dealt with directly without being discon-
nected or removed from F. Faulttree and its subroutines pass
arguments in the form of F-modules. This is actually accom-
plished in the program by passing a variable containing a
pointer to the F-module top. The subroutines treat the F-
module as a fault tree by never searching above the F-module
top.
In the subroutines Sreduce and Condition, some sections
of the code were written in block format. That is, sections
of code can be removed or inserted depending on the event
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types to be represented in the fault tree. These blocks will
make it easy to modify this program for use of other specific
event types by insertion of the proper blocks of code.
C. INPUT AND OUTPUT
The input for Faulttree is a data file describing F.
The first line of the data gives integer values for the number
of events and the highest event identification number. The
remainder of the file gives the detailed event data. Each
event occupies two lines of the file. The first line gives
three integers: event identification, event type, and number
of events directly below. The second line lists the events
below by identification or gives event probability for a basic
event. Figure 3-2 is a sample input data file.
Faulttree outputs either the system failure probability
or a set of equations forming an expression for g(p_) . This
expression is in the form of a three part Pascal program
"FTE" (Fault Tree Expression) . Faulttree prints the heading
"FTE-heading" and a subroutine "TEP" (Top Event Probability)
for FTE while the main program "FTE-main" is kept permanently
on file. TEP contains the equations which are printed by
Faulttree in reducing F. It is configured to receive the
argument p from FTE-main and return g(p). TEP and FTE-main
use variables and arrays declared in FTE-heading. FTE-
heading is printed by Faulttree after reductions on F are
complete. Two arrays are declared in the heading. The


















Figure 3-2 Sample Input Data File
other dummy events which may have been created during event
splitting or reconfiguration. The secondary array is used in
pivotal decomposition to store the conditional probability
for an event while a probability is computed for the same
event given the opposite condition. The size of this array
is no greater than the deepest recursion level of Faulttree.
The heading is printed after TEP since array sizes for FTE
are not available in Faulttree until F has been completely
reduced. FTE-main is a routine which reads p from the input
data file and invokes TEP to compute g (p) . When FTE-heading,
TEP, and FTE-main are combined to create FTE , FTE is ready to
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be compiled and executed. FTE reads from the same data file
that Faulttree reads but only extracts the values for p_ in
the process. FTE outputs the probability of the top event
but can be usefully configured to compute event importances
or perform other computations which require g(p_).
D. PROGRAM TESTING
Faulttree was tested on four fault trees, two of which
are hypothetical, "Exampl" and "Examp2," and two of which are
actual models of systems used in practice. One system,
"Aircraft," represents the combat attrition of a single
aircraft while another, "Nuke," represents a nuclear reactor
accident. Input data files were created for the four fault
trees, and Faulttree was executed for each to directly com-
pute g(F) . Faulttree was again executed for each data file
to produce four versions of FTE. Descriptions of the fault
trees and data from test runs are given in Table 3-3.
TABLE 3--3
Test Runs
Exampl Examp2 Aircraft Nuke
events 64 79 105 339
rep. events 7 15 4 59
CPU time 0.001 0.371 0.001
events stored 112 330 178 2586
FTE equations 36 102 51 153,733
FTE CPU time 0.000 0.033 0.000
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Nuke, described in the table, is actually a revised version
of the original data. The original data contained 345 events
of which 65 were replicated. Further explanation of the
modification of this data is given below.
The table gives CPU time in seconds. All CPU times
reported in this thesis exclude time required for input/output
As a measure of storage the maximum number of event records
needed to compute each problem is included as "events stored."
Also, the number of equations printed into FTE is listed.
For all of the fault trees except Nuke, FTE was successfully
compiled and executed, computing the system failure proba-
bility in less time than required by Faulttree. The times for
execution of FTE are given in Table 3-3 in the row denoted
FTE CPU time.
Initial tests on Nuke were made using the original data
file. The first solution attempt for direct computation of
g(F) required more than five hours of clock time for Fault-
tree during a low utilization period on the VAX. Exact CPU
time was not determined. When Faulttree was reexecuted to
produce FTE, over 600,000 equations were printed into TEP
.
This subroutine was too large to be compiled. Further tests
were conducted with this data alone with the objective of re-
ducing the number of equations being printed. First, data
was generated from Faulttree to see what size modules were
being located and to determine the extent of the reductions
being accomplished by pivotal decomposition. It was found
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that after the first call to Sreduce, which removed only
six events, the fault tree was a prime F-module with all 65
replicated events and 339 of the original events still intact.
Several successful and unsuccessful techniques were imple-
mented for reducing the size of TEP . The replacement proce-
dure was implemented in Sreduce, and output was reduced to
about 425,000 lines. Up to this point, replicated events
for conditioning had been selected randomly. This worked
satisfactorily for small problems. Various heuristics for
choosing replicated events e. for conditioning were tested
with Nuke. Three of these which required linear time com-
plexity were choosing e. with (a) the greatest out-degree,
(b) the least distance in links from the top event, and
(c) the greatest distance in links from the top event.
Implementation of heuristic (a) reduced output to about
417,000 lines while (b) and (c) increased the amount of output
Next, the reconfiguration procedure was developed, and it
reduced the output to about 415,000 lines. The heuristic
for computing min (max|R. |) for all replicated basic events
e^E jeJ J
was then added. This enhancement reduced output to 2 2 5,000
lines of output. Finally a crude graphical representation
of the fault tree was produced with the hope that some visual
clue might aid selective conditioning. Two sets of four
replicated basic events were found. Every event in each set
was linked to the same two intermediate events of four
intermediate events total. The eight basic events were
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replaced in the input data file by two basic events after
hand-computing probabilities for the two new basic events
based on the union of the four events each one replaced.
With this revised data, Faulttree produced only 153,733
equations.
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IV. RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS
Pivotal decomposition has been shown to be a good method
for computing system failure probabilities in fault trees,
at least for the problems analyzed here. The basic algorithm
in conjunction with several enhancements has computed exact
probability for a fairly large fault tree having 345 events
with 65 of them replicated. Some of these enhancements
were key factors in reducing the amount of computation re-
quired by the basic algorithm. If other methods of reducing
this computation can be applied to the computer code developed
in this thesis, this program will be capable of being used
as a tool in analysis of even larger fault trees.
A. FINDINGS
Space complexity was not a limiting factor in solving
any of these fault trees. The greatest use of storage
occurred in computing g(F) for Nuke. The total number of
event records created was less than eight times the amount
needed to store the original fault tree alone. Since the
recursion level was noted to exceed 43 at some points during
execution, the factor of eight is less than might be expected.
The system storage requirements for a high recursion level
such as this are probably more significant than the storage
of problem data. The greatest limiting factor for computing






) which also gives the complexity for the length of
TEP. In this complexity figure, the factor | L | is insigni-
ficant. Efforts to reduce complexity must be directed
toward the factor 2 . The fault tree aspects which most
influence this factor are the number of replicated events and
the structural characteristics of the fault tree which allow
or make difficult its modularization. Even a fault tree with
a large r value should not be difficult for Faulttree to
reduce if it has one of the following three properties:
(a) No prime F-modules contain a large r, (b) r is greatly
reduced after a few recursions of pivotal decomposition,
or (c) non-complex F-modules (low r per F-module) begin to
form after a few recursions of pivotal decomposition.
Faulttree and FTE have been shown to be useful for the
three fault trees Exampl , Examp2 , and Aircraft. Faulttree
computed top event probability in a fraction of a second,
and FTE used less time. As a test of applicability FTE-
main was modified to compute Birnbaum importances for every
basic event in a given fault tree. For each basic event this
requires two computations of top event probability by TEP.
The number of basic events and time in seconds to compute all
their Birnbaum importances are shown in Table 4 for the three
fault trees
.
Examp2 is the most complex fault tree of the three as
evidenced by comparing the numbers of replicated events and










(See Table 3-3.) For Examp2, 72 computations of g(p_) are
made in about one-fifth of the amount of time required to
compute g(F) directly.
FTE was unable to be tested on Nuke due to the size of
the subroutine TEP produced by Faulttree. Direct computation
of g(F) was successful, although it required much CPU time.
The structure of this fault tree impeded the formation of
proper F-modules after reductions from conditioning. In fact,
following as many as five conditionings, no replicated events
are eliminated except for the one conditioned, and no proper
F-modules are created.
Although the version of TEP produced with Nuke is presently
too large to compile and use, it was reduced in size by more
than 75 percent from the first execution by several innovations
which were discussed in Chapter III. The large reductions
accomplished by the implementation of replacement show that
there are many instances of intermediate events with only
one unreplicated basic event below. Although this technique
was trivially easy to use, it was highly significant in
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reducing the size of TEP. The addition of reconfiguration
to the program reduced TEP by less than one percent. This
may seem insignificant; however. Nuke only has three 2-out-of-3
events. Of the three, one is reduced and disposed in the
first call to Sreduce leaving only two in the fault tree for
pivotal decomposition. Before implementing reconfiguration
if the cut vertex of an F-module F* £ F was a 2-out-of-3
event, and one of the events connected into the cut vertex
was not in F
'
, then F' could not be used but instead served
to complicate F and impede the computational process. It
is believed that reconfiguration will significantly reduce
the actual complexity of any fault tree with many 2-out-of-3
events
.
The heuristic for selecting events to condition reduced
the size of TEP by 45 percent. Although this heuristic results
in increased time complexity for Faulttree, the great reduc-
tion in the size of TEP is worthwhile.
It is hoped that pivotal decomposition, combined with
techniques discussed in this thesis and other techniques,
will be useful in the analysis of large fault trees. More
methods of making reductions and locating F-modules exist.
However, time limitations preclude their application in this
thesis. It is believed that the addition of some of these
other methods to Faulttree would greatly increase the range
of solvable problems.
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B. SUGGESTED FURTHER RESEARCH
There are many further enhancements to the pivotal
decomposition method of fault tree probability computation
which could increase the usability of Faulttree.
This thesis used the 2-out-of-3 event to demonstrate how
techniques for K-out-of-N events can be applied. Specific
K-out-of-N events would be easy to implement in the existing
program. Other possible enhancements could be the addition
of algorithms to compute probabilities of a general K-out-of-N
event during simple reductions. To be of any practical use,
this algorithm must handle a set of input events with unequal
probabilities. In conjunction with this there should be a
method for reconfiguration of an F-module with a general K-out-
of-N cut vertex.
There exist other methods of locating F-modules and
generalizations of F-modules that can locate more useful
structures which are overlooked by the depth first search
method applied here. The method used in this thesis only
locates an F-module which is attached to the fault tree
by a cut vertex. Wood [Ref. 30] uses a search for tri-
connected components in solving network reliability problems,
and this method could be used to locate F-modules connected
by separating pairs. Applied to this algorithm for fault
trees, additional F-modules would be located which aren't
being located by the present method. For example, the two
sets of four replicated events which were reduced to two
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replicated events by hand computation were both examples of
tri-connected components which would have been detected and
reduced as F-modules thus reducing the overall problem
complexity.
It may be sufficient in many applications to compute
g(F) approximately or to obtain upper and lower bounds on
g(F). Corynen [Ref. 26] is able to solve large problems and
obtains accurate bounds without considering all branches of
the backtrack search structure. In Faulttree, lower bounding
could be accomplished by saving the product P, of the proba-
bilities of all events which have been conditioned up to
recursion level k. The most recent value of P, for all kk
is saved so that it is available during backtracking and
further recursion. When P. < 6 for some small 6 > 0, then
further recursions are unnecessary since the term in the
pivotal decomposition algorithm is approaching zero. The
algorithm can backtrack, and the term associated with the
current recursion need not be added into the computation
of g(F) . If used, this method removes Faulttree from the
realm of exact methods , and it might be risky to use the
resulting expression for computation of system failure proba-
bility when the p. values vary over a wide range.
There is surely a lower bound on the number of equations
which must be written to give an expression for g(p_) for a
particular fault tree. For some large fault trees the lower
bound will be too large thus preventing the compilation of
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the subroutine TEP . In this case TEP can be subdivided into
multiple subroutines to be compiled separately and linked for
execution.
By including some of these suggested additions to the
work already accomplished, it is believed that Faulttree and
FTE will be useful tools for fault tree analysis.
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